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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Limitation on Right of Free Speech-Defendant, self-styled "anti-Jewish" congressional candidate, was charged
with violation of a statute defining as disorderly conduct any language tending to cause a breach of the peace.1 Held, motion to dismiss charges
refused. Freedom of speech is relative and must be exercised in consonance with public peace. People ex rel. Neiman V. McWilliams, 22,
N. Y. S. (2d) 571 (N. Y. City Mag. Ct. J94o).2
The instant case illustrates the basic conflict between freedom of
speech 3 and the maintenance of public order.4 The right of free speech is
relative,5 its scope "a question of proximity and degree." 6 Whether
defendant's words have caused a "clear and present danger" of the occurrence of the evil legislated against is a test used by the Supreme Court to
measure both congressional 7 and states restrictions on freedom of speech
and press. Indefinite, 9 and perhaps not unintentionally so, 10 even this
standard has sometimes been disregarded by a majority of the Court."
Whether the questioned legislation imposes an ascertainable standard of
i. "Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a
breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the following acts shall be

deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct: (i) Uses offensive, dis-

orderly, threatening, abusive, or insulting language, conduct, or behavior; (2) Acts in
such manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive to others."
N. Y. CR. LAW AND PEN. CODE (Gilbert, 1935) § 722.
2. Upon formal complaint drawn in conformity with the opinion, defendant was
found guilty and, after mental observation, was sentenced to the workhouse. See instant case at 58o.
3. "The freedom of speech and of the press secured by the First Amendment
against abridgment by the United States is similarly secured to all persons by the
Fourteenth against abridgment by a state." Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 16o
(939); Herndon v. Lowery, 301 U. S. 242 (937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S.
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(1925).

4. "Besides actual breaches of the peace, anything that tends to provoke or excite
others to break it is an offense of the same denomination." 4 By. CoMm. *50.
"Any
other act . . . which has a direct tendency to cause a breach of the public peace, is
a misdemeanor at common law. It is not necessary that there shall be actual force
and violence. . . ." CLARK AND MARSHALI, C IumiNAL LAW (3d ed. 1927) § 417.
Actual danger to the peace is shown by the fact that defendant was speaking in a city
one-fifth of whose population is Jewish.
5. "The First Amendment, while prohibiting legislation against free speech as such
cannot have been and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible
use of language." Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 206 (1919). See Mr.
Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 359, 373 (1926);
CHAFEE, FREEDoM OF SPEECH (1920) 7.

6. Schenk v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (i919).
7. Ibid. CHAFEE, oP. cit. supra note 5, at 87-I06; Johnson, Post-War Protection
of Freedom of Opinion (1940) I WASH1. ANeD LEE L.REV. 192, at 193-195.
8. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 3io U. S. 296, 3io (i94o); Herndon v. Lowery, 3o
U. S. 242, 26r (I937).

.9"As cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the
circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of
the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights." Schneider v. State, 3o8 U. S.147,
I6I (1939).

io."This Court has not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when a dan-

ger shall be deemed clear. . . " Mr.Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v.
California, 274 U. S. 359, 374 (1926).

ii. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 667 (1925) (dissenting opinion);
Schaeffer v. United States, 251 U. S.466, 482 (919) (dissenting opinion). Compare
with the majority opinions.
(385)
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conduct or is so indefinite as to constitute a denial of due process 1 2 is
another test generally used, but the courts sometimes disagree as to its
application. 1 3 The nature of the intent necessary to make the action unlawful, whether directly to effect the "clear and present danger" 1 or merely
indirectly and secondarily to cause it,"5 has been disputed. That the interest of the State in self-preservation is the interest conflicting with that in
free speech 16 accounts for a variation in these decisions 1 7 reflecting
national exigencies.' 8 An emergency theory is here well-recognized, 9 and
the court in effect says that by these words, under these circumstances,
defendant exceeded the limits of protected free speech. Nevertheless, traditional American regard for personal liberty 20 has restricted the use of the
theory to relatively few such fact situations 2L and has prevented "previous
restraint" (censorship) of expression. 22 In the instant case the court indicates as determinative the emergency element, 23 as well as the clear and
present danger from defendant's remarks. 24 The statute as applied was
not too vague, 25 and defendant's evident intent was to incite anti-Jewish
action as well as sentiment. Moreover, it is possible that the decision
marks the beginning of a trend back toward the more severe regulation of
free expression characteristic of war-time conditions.

Corporations-Right to Compensation of Attorney Employed by
President-President of defendant corporation engaged the plaintiff
to defend the corporation in a suit brought by a shareholder for dissolu12. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921)
(Food Control
Act of 1917 held unconstitutional as too indefinite); International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216 (1914) (Kentucky anti-trust legislation held so indefinite as
to constitute denial of due process).
13. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Herndon v. Lowery, 301 U. S.

242 (937).

14. Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 216 (1919) ; Dearborn Publishing Co. v.
Fitzgerald, 271 Fed. 479 (N. D. Ohio 1921) ; see Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S.

616, 628 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
15. Pierce et al. v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (192o) ; see id. at 253 (dissenting
opinion).
16. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 667 (1925); Mr. Justice Brandeis,
concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 359, 373 (1926) ; PATrsoN, FREE
SPEECH AND A FREE

PRESS (939)

168.

17. Swisher, Civil Liberties in War Time (194o) 55 POL. ScI. Q. 321, at 321. Compare Herndon v. Lowery, 301 U. S. 242 (1937) with Abrams v. United States, 25o
U. S.616 (2929).
18. "When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right."
Schenk v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919). PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note I6,
at 168; Johnson, loc. cit. sipra note 7, at 195.
1g. "We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying
all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights."
Schenk v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919). See Whitney v. California, 274 U. S.
359, 373 (1926) (concurring opinion) ; Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 628
(I929)

(dissenting opinion).

See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 (294o) ; Whitney v. California,
274 U. S. 359, 377 (1926) (concurring opinion).
20.

22. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496 (1939) ; De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1936).
22. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496 (1939) ; Dearborn Publishing Co. v. Fitzgerald, 271 Fed. 479 (N. D. Ohio 2922).
23.

Instant case at 573.

24. Id. at 574.

25. "The statute is not to be overthrown merely because other instances may be
suggested to which also it might have been applied." Whitney v. California, 274 U. S.
359, 370 (926).
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tion. There was no evidence that the president, who was also treasurer
and one of the two directors, had such authority delegated to him, had exercised similar powers before, or was a general manager. In an action to
recover the agreed compensation the court held that the president did not
have authority to bind the corporation to the special contract. Kelly v.
Citizens Finance Co. of Lowell, Inc., 28 N. E. (2d) IOO5 (Mass. 194o).
Dogma has it that the president may employ counsel to conduct specific litigation on behalf of the corporation,' but while a few courts have
held such authority exists virtute officii, 2 most have studied the factual situation and decided accordingly. Thus, the president's share in the management 3 and ownership, 4 the type of corporation, 5 the reason for employing
counsel, 6 the equal division of the board of directors 7 or previous action by
them," and the fact that the corporation had employed the same attorney
before,9 have each wielded decisive influence in individual cases. It is
significant that the instant court not only refused to accept the dogma, but
also made no reference to the surrounding circumstances. Because of the
nature of their business, 10 finance companies are often involved in litigation, yet to retain permanent counsel might be too costly, while the delay
consequent to calling a meeting of the board of directors each time a legal
issue arose might prove damaging. Moreover, when the action is in defense
of the corporation, as it was in the instant case, it is often necessary to act
quickly to preserve vital corporate rights. Further, the holding of a substantial number of shares by the president is another factor to be consid(Perm. ed. 1931) § 618; 4 COOK, CORPORATIONS
ed. 1923) § 716; 2 THoMPsoN, CoRPoRATIoNs (3rd ed. i9o9) § 1543; 14a C. J.
472. Compare 2 SAVIDGF, PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1926) § goi. However most of these statements are qualified by a list of the decisions which have held
contra. E. g. 2 FLE-cHER, loc. cit. supra n. 46.
2. Old Dominion Trust Co v. First Nat'l Bank, 26o Fed. 22 (C. C. A. 4th, 199) ;
Beebe v. Beebe Co., 64 N. J. L. 497, 46 Atl. 168 (igoo) ; Colman v. West Virginia
Oil & Oil Lands Co., 25 W. Va. 148 (1884) ; accord, Reno Water Co. v. Leete, 17
Nev. 203, 30 Pac. 702 (1882).
(President
3. Sarmiento v. Davis Boat Co., 3o5 Mich. 3o, 63 N. W. 2o5 (895)
was also general manager. Held: authority); 2 FLrcrE, loc. cit. supra note 3,
§ 673 and n. 79. Potter v. New York Infant Asylum, 44 Hun (N. Y.) 367 (1887)
(President had previously employed counsel. Held: authority).
4. Campbell v. Hanford, 67 Cal. App. 155, 227 Pac. 234 (1924) (President was
one of two partners who owned about 98% of the shares. Held: authority).
5. Bank v. Berry, 53 Kan. 696, 37 Pac. 131, 24 L. R. A. 719 (1894); accord,
Savings Bank of Cincinnati v. Benton, 2 Met. (Ky.) 240 (1859). 3 R. C. L. 442.
Because of the nature of the business done by banks there is virtually complete accord
on the question of the president's authority to conduct litigation.
6. Savings Bank of Cincinnati v. Benton, 2 Met. (Ky.) 24o (1859) (President
hired counsel to "defend" the corporation. Held: authority); accord, Fernald v.
Spokane & British Columbia T. & T. Co., 31 Wash. 672, 72 Pac. 462 (1o3). Pacific
Bank v. Stone, 121 Cal. 202, 53 Pac. 634 (1898) (President employed counsel to
"institute" suit. Held: no authority). Dent v. People Bank of Imboden, 118 Ark.
157, 175 S. W. 1154 (1915) (Contract was for annual employment not specific
litigation. Held: no authority).
7. Regal Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. v. Merlis, 274 Fed. 915 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921),
which is discussed in (1922) 70 U. OF PA. L. REv. 328, and (1922) 35 HARV. L. REV.
339; Elbum Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 32o N. J. L. 6o4, I A. (2d) 204 (938), which
is discussed in (1938) 52 HARv. L. REV. 321, (1938) 5 U. OF PiTT. L. Rav. 44, and
(1939) 48 YALE L. J. 3O82.
8. Cf. Bright v. Metaire Cemetery Ass'n, 33 La. Ann. 58 (1881) (Board of
directors had previously retained an attorney for the corporation. Held: no authority).
9. Tra-der v. Minneapolis Cedar & Lumber Co., 128 Minn. 295, 15o N. W. 914
(I915) (The attorney hired by the president had defended the corporation on prior
occasions. Held: authority).
io. The nature of the business and the volume of litigation of finance companies
is analogous to that of banks. See note 5 supro.

(8th

I. 2 FixrcHER, CORPORATIONS
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ered,11 and while the extent of the president's shareholdings is not disclosed in the instant case, it may be indicated by the many important
positions he held. Further, the corporation was greatly benefited by the
president's act; dissolution was successfully resisted, and this, too, should
be weighed in determining whether or not the corporation is to avoid the
corresponding burden.' 2 In addition, there were only two directors and
if, after a consultation, they had failed to agree it would have forced a stalemate, 3 which would, if the instant opinion were controlling, inevitably end
in dissolution by default. 14 Therefore, a more practical solution in such a
situation would be to clothe the president with authority to conduct specific litigation.' 5

Equity-Restrictions and Equitable Servitudes upon the Use of
Phonograph Records-Where orchestra recordings bore the legend,
"Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" ' and the defendant used the records
in its broadcasts it was held, neither the orchestra leader nor the manufacturer of the records was entitled to injunctive relief since all the property
in the records was lost upon sale, the restriction being ineffective. 2 R C A
Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman, et al., 114 Fed. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1940.)s

The common law I concept of literary property

5

has been properly

ii. Accord: Campbell v. Hanford, 67 Cal. App. 155, 227 Pac. 234 (1924).

12. While the attorney could probably recover the reasonable value of his services
on an implied promise, the writer does not feel that he should be made to accept what
the jury may believe is a reasonable compensation for his work. See instant case
at 1OO7.

13. Luigi De Pasquale v. Societa de M. S. Maria, 54 R. I. 339, 173 Atl. 623
This case presented an analogous situation, action being brought by an
attorney who had been employed by several officers of a corporation to defend a suit
instituted by the president to enjoin those officers from calling a meeting of the board
of directors and otherwise usurping the president's powers. The court held that the
officers had implied authority to employ counsel, basing their decision on the fact
that the situation created an emergency which made such authority necessary, citing
(1934).

the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 47.
14. Under the instant decision the only method of authorizing an attorney to

defend a suit against the corporation is by an action of the board of directors. If the
board of directors were evenly divided then such authorization would be impossible.
Thus no one would have authority to employ an attorney, the bill would not be
answered, and the corporation would lose by default.
15. This may be controlled by statutory provisions. Compare i LA. GEN. STAT.
ANN. (Dart, 1939) § 1115 (7), with PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 15,
§ 2852-406.

I. Some of the recordings were marked "Only for Noncommercial Use on
Phonographs in Homes. Mfr. and Original Purchaser Have Agreed This Record
Shall Not Be Resold or Used for Any Other Purpose. See Detailed Notice on
Envelope". Instant case at 87.
2. ".

.

. We think that the 'common law property' in these performances ended

with the sale of the records and that the restriction did not save it; and that if it did,
the records themselves could not be clogged with a servitude." Instant case at 88.
3. Reversing the judgment of the District Court in 28 Fed. Supp. 787 (S. D.
N. Y. 1939) where an injunction was granted on the basis of unfair competition.
4. DRONE, COPYRIGHT (1879) 5, 97-139.
5. For a definition of "literary property" as distinguished from "copyright" see
BLAcE, LA W DiclONARY (3rd ed. 1933)

1123.

The following types of intellectual

productions have been protected as being the proper subjects of literary property:
artistic creations, Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. R. 201 (K. B. 1769) ;
Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. R. 257 (K. B. 1774); musical

compositions, The Mikado, Etc., Case (Carte v. Duff), 25 Fed. 183 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1885) ; plays, Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424 (1912) ; photoplays, Universal
Film Co. v. Copperman, 218 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1914) ; architect's plans, Gendell
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extended ' to phonographic recordings 7 where the musician has added
something artistic and distinctive in his rendition. Earlier cases held that
literary property was lost by a promiscuous sale of copies to the public 8
in spite of the fact that restrictions on use, as in the instant case, indicated
clearly that there was dedication only for a specific purpose. Now, however, a qualified or restrictive dissemination not involving absolute abandonment or dedication to the public will preserve the property right.9 While
business has favored a policy of restricting the use of chattels in the hands
of purchasers, the courts have been reluctant to enforce equitable servitudes
which impose minimum resale prices and thus violate the policy favoring
free trade.1 0 But where, as in the instant case, the restriction is merely
one of user," as distinguished from one fixing resale price which more
v. Orr, 13 Phila. I9I (Pa. 1879) ; etchings, Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeG. & S.
652, 64 Eng. Rep. R. 293 (Ch. 1848) ; comic figures, Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N. Y. 414,
132 N. E. 133 (1921); advertising schemes, Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., Inc. v.
Meyer, ioI Ind. App. 42o, 194 N. E. 2o6 (1935) ; writings DRONE, COPYRIGHT (1879)
97; dress designs, Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 114 Fed. (2d) 8o (C. C. A. 2nd, 1940).
6. The common law and the civil law have extended the concept of literary property to a performer (e. g. an actor or musician) on the theory that complete originality
is not required. Waring v. W D A S Broadcasting Company, 327 Pa. 433, 439, 194
Atl. 631, 634 (1937). Latin American and European Codes give express protection
to the performing artists against unauthorized exploitation of their recorded renditions. HoMBuRG, LE Daorr D'INERaxErA0ION (Speiser Trans. 1934) 155 et seq. See
(1938) 42 DicK. L. REv. 88. It is sufficient that something new has been added by
virtue of the performer's unique arrangement or interpretation. One who substantially
improves another's original work has a property right in the improvement; thus an
improvement over the original is patentable. Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., I1 U. S.
186 (1894) ; Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Tire Co., 220 U. S. 428 (I91) ; Gross
v. Frank, 293 Fed. 702 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923). A work need not be new to be protected
by copyright. Chappell & Co., Ltd. v. Fields, 21o Fed. 864 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1914);
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Picture Corp., 81 Fed. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1936). A
new right is also created where one adds his artistic interpretation to another's musical
work. See Aronson v. Baker, 43 N. J. Eq. 365, 371, 12 Atl. 177, 182 (1888) ; Chaplin
v. Amador, 93 Calif. App. 358, 269 Pac. 544 (1928); NIms, UNFAIR COMPErITION
(3rd ed. 1929) § 278b; MARCHErrI, LAW OF STAGE, SCREEN AND RADIO (0936) § 28.
7. Common law property exists in many types of reproductions. Thus, a photographic reproduction of a painting is protected. Oertel v. Wood, 4o How. Pr. io
(N. Y. 1870). Where an author writes a play based upon a novel, he has a property
right in the play which is violated when a moving picture is made from this play.
O'Neill v. General Film Co., 152 N. Y. Supp. 599 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Selig Polyscope
Co. v. Unicorn Film Service Corp., 163 N. Y. Supp. 62 (Sup. Ct. 1917). But mechanical recordings of musical renditions are not protected by the copyright laws. 35
Stat. 1O76 (199o), 17 U. S. C. A. § 5 (927), amended by 37 Stat. 488 (1912), I7
U. S. C. A. § 5 (1927). Thus, by analogy to other types of reproductions, literary
property has been held to exist in distinctive and artistic recordings of musical renditions. Waring v. W D A S Broadcasting Company, 327 Pa. 433, 194 At. 631 0937);
8. Larrowe-Loisette v. O'Loughlin, 88 Fed. 896 (S. D. N. Y. 1898); Jewelers'
Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Wkly. Pub. Co., 155 N. Y. 241, 49 N. E. 872 (1898).
9. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424 (1912) (producing a play) ; American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284 (9o7)
(exhibiting a painting); Nutt v.
National Institute, Inc., For The Improvement of Memory, 31 Fed. (2d) 236 (C. C.
A. 2nd, 1929) (delivering a lecture) ; Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 81
Fed. (2d) 373 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936) (radio broadcasts); McCarthy & Fischer v.
White, 259 Fed. 364 (§. D. N. Y. 1919) (playing a musical composition).
io. Restrictions fixing a minimum resale price have been held to be unenforceable.
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 21o U. S. 339 (19o8) ; Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229
U. S. I (1913). But see a holding to the effect that a statute allowing the fixing of
the resale price of certain trademarked articles is not unconstitutional. Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936). A restriction
that the commodity should be used only in connection with certain other articles manufactured by the vendor has been held unenforceable. Motion Pictures Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502 (1916).
ii. See note i, supra.
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directly affects marketability,12 there has been an increasing judicial recognition of the desirability 13 of allowing such covenants to accompany the
alienation of chattels. 14 Where, in addition, indiscriminate broadcasting of
a popular song gluts the public appetite and reduces the ultimate profit to
the orchestra leader who is actively competing with the broadcasting company for commercial sponsors, acts amounting to unfair competition call
for equitable relief."5 The modern test for determining what acts of competition are unfair is not concerned with elements of fraud or deception; "
if there is an unreasonable appropriation of another's trade values, then the
competition is unfair.' 7 The broadcasting company might well have been
enjoined on the ground that its conduct amounted to an unfair appropriation of the product of the talent and labor of the orchestra leader, on the
theory that even a general dedication to the public is not a publication to
a competitor.' 8 A more complete enforcement of covenants running with
chattels against purchasers with notice, wherever there is a strong practical
demand for such covenants and where they do not unduly threaten free
See note io, supra.
13. Wade, Restrictions on User (1928) 44 L. Q. REv. 51, 64-65. "Just as modern
needs have brought equitable restrictions on land, of which the common law knew
12.

nothing, into existence, they may also call for a limited departure from the free
transfer of chattels for the sake of promoting desirable business practices wholly
strange to Coke's day."

Chafee, Equitable Seritudes on Chattels (1928) 41 H

v.L.

REv. 945, 983. "The tendency in the United States has been to apply the doctrine of

restrictive agreements to personal property when not regarded as an unlavful restraint of trade or in violation of public policy." Stone, The Equitable Rights and
Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract (1918) 18 COL L. REV. 291, 320.
14. See In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co., 48 Fed. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1931) ; P. Lorillard v. Weingarden, 28o Fed. 238 (W. D. N. Y. 1922) ; see also Noble
v. One Sixty Commonwealth Ave., 19 Fed. Supp. 671, 672 (D. C. Mass. 1937). A
clear cut recognition has been given to the principle of equitable servitudes on chattels
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Waring v. W D A S Broadcasting Co., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (937) 86 U. OF PA. L. RE:v. 217. There an

orchestra leader recorded songs for a manufacturer of phonograph records. Each
record when sold was marked "Not Licensed For Radio Broadcasting". It was held
that the orchestra leader could enjoin the broadcasting of these records in spite of the
fact that the broadcasting company had the consent of the copyright owners of the

songs. This holding was based on the reasoning that the orchestra leader had a property interest in the rendition of the songs, and that the equitable servitude upon the

records was effective, and that the acts of the broadcasting company constituted unfair
competition. The concurring opinion of Maxey, J. gave another ground for granting
the injunction, namely, the leader's right to privacy. However, it is submitted that
this is not quite as sound a basis for the holding, and the instant case properly rejected
that argument in view of the fact that the leader was a public figure. See HARPER,
LAW OF TORTS (933) § 277; Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co., 113 Fed. (2d) 8o6 (C. C.
A. 2nd, 194o).
15. Damages at law are an inadequate remedy for the violation of business rights.
WALSH, EQUITY (930)

214.

16. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.

(ig1g) 67 U.

OF PA.

L. REv. 1I

S. 215 (I928), Note
(Copying news items from earlier editions held un-

fair competition).
17. ". . . The element of fraud plays a smaller role and liability is now imposed for methods of appropriating, or causing harm to, another's trade values more
539. The
subtle than fraudulent "passing off". 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (938)

modern test of unfair competition has been laid down as follows, "What is reasonable
and fair as distinguished from unreasonable and unfair acts of competition must be
determined, as are the wrongfulness of acts of user in nuisance cases, by applying the
test of the average man under the circumstances of each case." WALSH, EQUrY
(1930) 235.
I8. Ward Baking Co. v. Potter-Wrightington, 298 Fed. 398 (C. C. A. Ist, 1924)
Associated Press v. K V 0 S, Inc., 8o Fed. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) ; Uproar

Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 81 Fed. (2d) 373 (C. C. A. Ist, 1936); see also
Grismore, Are Unfair Methods of Competition Actionable at the Suit of a Competitor? (935) 33 MicH. L. REV. 322; NIs, UNFIRAm ComPErTION (3rd ed. 1929)

§§ ga, 374.
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trade 11 should be combined with the extension of the doctrine of unfair
competition so as to be in keeping with the growing view that enforcement
of good morals in business is a proper judicial function. 20 Thus, in fact situations similar
2 1 to the instant case, a greater measure of protection might be
anticipated.

Jurisdiction-Joinder by Original Defendant of Nonresident Defendant as Additional Party when Suit is Started in County Other
Than That in Which Accident Occurred-The instant case may best
be analyzed by a comparison with previous decisions tracing the development in this field.
Case r: Automobile accident occurred in County A. Plaintiff sued
defendant, a resident of state, in County B by deputized service. Defendant objects. Held, for defendant. The right to use deputized service
against a resident defendant exists only where suit is maintained in
County A.'
Case 2: Automobile accident in County A. Plaintiff sued defendant,
a nonresident of the state, in County B by substituted service. Defendant
objects. Held, for defendant. Plaintiff may use substituted service against
a nonresident only if he sues in County A. In view of 2Case x, venue was
limited to prcvent discrimination against a nonresident.
Case 3: Automobile accident in County A in which two defendants,
both residents of the state, are involved. Plaintiff sues defendant i in
County B by personal service. Defendant i joins defendant 2 as an additional defendant by deputized service. Defendant 2 objects because defendant I has only equal rights with plaintiff and Case i held that plaintiff had
no such right in County B. Held, for defendant i. If plaintiff had sued
in County A, defendant i would have had this right. To refuse joinder in
County B would permit plaintiff by arbitrary choice of the county of suit
to defeat original defendant's rights.3
Case 4: Same facts as in Case 3, save that defendant 2 is a nonresident, and defendant i, having been sued and personally served in
County B, seeks to join defendant 2 by substituted service.4 Held, for
defendant 2. The plaintiff cannot use substituted service to sue nonresident defendant 2 in County A (Case 2), and defendant i has only equal
rights with plaintiff. Nathan v. McGinley, Pa. Supreme Ct., October 28,
1940.
ig. See note x3, sutra.

20. See (933)
18 CORN. L. Q. 139; WALSH, EQurry (i93o) §47.
21. Application for certiorarito the Supreme Court of the United States docketed
November 9, i94o. (194o) 9 U. S. L. WEEm 3125.
1. MooR VEHICLE CODE, Act of May I, 1929, P. L. 905, § 12o8, as amended June
22, i931, P. L. 751, §2, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 75, §738, Gossard v.
Gossard, 319 Pa. 129, 131, 178 Atl. 837, 838 (935); Williams v. Meredith, 326 Pa.
570, 573, 192 At. 924, 925 (937).

2. Williams v. Meredith, 326 Pa. 570, 192 Atl. 924 (1937), U. OF PiTT.L. REv. 8I,
overruling Aversa v. Aubry, 3o3 Pa. 139, 154 At. 311 (1931).
3. Gossard v. Gossard, 319 Pa. 129, 178 Atl. 837 (1935).
4. Petition to join an additional party defendant was made under the new rules of
court regulating this procedure. PA. RuLEs OF CT.2252 (right to petition for joinder),
PA. RuLEs OF CT.2254 (service of process on additional parties) : "A defendant shall
have the same rights in securing service as the plaintiff had for service in said action.
If the action was instituted in the county where the cause of action arose, or where a
transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose, the
defendant shall also have the right of service in any other county by having the sheriff
of the county wherein the action was instituted deputize the sheriff of any other
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Case 4 may be supported by a strict application of the limit placed on
venue against non-residents by Case 2. However, Case i placed the same
limit on venue against residents, and Case 3 permitted joinder even though
plaintiff sued in a county other than that in which the accident occurred.
Thus, this flexible treatment of venue seems to militate against the strictly
logical approach of Case 4.

The nonresidence of defendant 2 is the only

justification given for the divergent results reached in Case 3 and Case 4.
No doubt the power of a court over a resident may in some instances be

greater than that over a non-resident, even after jurisdiction over either has

been obtained. 5 But no difference is apparent in the case of venue under
the Motor Vehicle Code, for it was not limited against a nonresident
because of lack of due process but only to prevent discrimination in case of
a resident.6 Therefore, once jurisdiction has been established, venue may
be treated in the case of a nonresident exactly as it was in the case of a

resident. Thus, as in Case 3, it seems necessary to permit joinder by the
original defendant to prevent the defeat of his rights by the plaintiff's
arbitrary choice of a county of suit. 7 Consequently, since no constitutional
objection on the grounds of nonresidence can arise, joinder by an original
defendant of a non-resident additional defendant might well have been

justified."
Labor Law-Employer Opinion and Free Speech under the Wagner Act-The N. L. R. B. found that an employer had engaged in
unfair labor practices, and issued an order commanding it to cease and
desist, inter alia, from distributing among its employees literature criticizing
and disparaging labor organizations, although the literature in question
contained no express threats of discharge or discrimination. On petition
for enforcement, held, the order violated the constitutional guaranty of
1
N. L. R. B. v. Ford Motor Co., 9 U. S. L.
freedom of speech and press.

Week

2229

(C. C. A. 6th, 194o).

2
Mooted since the enactment of the Wagner Act, but raised squarely s

county wherein service may be had. Service shall be made in the same manner as is
required for service of writs of summons." The note to this section shows how this
rule broadens the rights of the original defendant where suit is started in the county
in which the cause of action arose.
5. Cf. Vaughn v. Love, 324 Pa. 276, I88 At. 299 (1936), where a sheriff's return
was held conclusive as to a resident, but not as to a nonresident. Of course it may be
argued that in this situation the court has never secured jurisdiction over the nonresident.
6. Williams v. Meredith, 326 Pa. 570, 192 Atl. 924 (1937). "To create a different
rule for nonresidents than exists against residents might give rise to a very serious
constitutional question. The construction here . . . promotes uniformity of service.
. . . This interpretation . . . avoids the difficulties of an unreasonable classification
between residents and nonresidents, which would be without apparent purpose.
at 574.
Authority supports this general statement. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352
(927), 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 93. GOODRICH, CONFLIcr OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) 165;
§ 77 (e) and § 84; Meleski. The Case of
RESTATEMENT, CoNFcIcT OF LAWS (934)
Hess v. Pawloski (927) 7 B. U. L. REV. 243; Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-Resident
Motorists (1926) 39 HARV. L. Rxv. 563.
7. Gossard v. Gossard, 319 Pa. 129, 133, 178 Atl. 837, 839 (1935) ; McCaulley v.
First Nat'l Bank, 37 Pa. D. & C. 143 (940).
8. This result was reached in a lower court case decided before the instant
opinion. McCaulley v. First Nat'l Bank, 37 Pa. D. & C. 143 (i94o). But this decision
does not adequately discuss the constitutional problem involved.
i. U. S. CONST. AMEND. I.
2. 49 STAT. 449 (935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i5i (Supp. i94o).
3. In N. L. R. B. v. Elkland Leather Co., 3 C. C. H. Labor Law Serv. 160,037
(C. C. A. 3d, 1940) cert. denied, N. Y. Times, Nov. i9,p. i, col. 8, although there was
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by the instant case, is the vital question of the extent to which an employer
may disseminate among his employees his views on unionization without
being guilty of an unfair labor practice.4 By basing its decision largely
upon the absence of express threats 5 of discharge or discrimination in the
literature distributed, the court seems to restrict the employer in this respect
only when there is conclusive evidence of his intent to interfere with the
right of self-organization of his workers. 6 The criterion contended for by
the Board-whether under the circumstances the employees were in fact
coerced 7-is thereby rejected. By analogy to various civil liberties cases,8 it
would seem that the Board took only a mediate position. More extreme, but
none the less plausible, would be the test that ignored both intent and effect,
and looked only to whther there would be a clear and present danger 9 that
the employees would be coerced by the statements of opinion. Fundamentally, since it is axiomatic that the doctrine of freedom of speech does
not sanction any and all kinds of utterances, 10 the problem is one of striking
a balance between two competing liberties. 1 That this balance should hinge
no specific cease and desist order, the court held that statem6nts of open shop policy,
delivered with employees' pay check during unionization campaign in an outside labor
organization are intended to discourage organization, and their issuance constituted an
unfair labor practice. But it should be noted, since there was a denial of certiorari,
that the Supreme Court has often said that the refusal of an application for a writ of
certiorari is in no way equivalent to an affirmance of the decree that is sought to be
reviewed, and imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case. Atlantic
Coast Line Ry. v. Powe, 283 U. S. 401 (1931); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf
Bro. & Co., 24o U. S. 251 (1916).
4. See Note (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 72.
S. Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Stackpole Carbon Co., IO5 F. (2d) 167 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939);
N. L. R. B. v. N. S. Abell Co., 97 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 4th, i938).
6. Other courts have indicated this result. Continental Box Co. v. N. L. R. B., 6
Lab. Rel. Rep. 671 (C. C. A. 5th, i94o); N. L. R. B. v. Union Pacific Stages, Inc.,
99 F. (2d) 153 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938). But cf. N. L. R. B. v. Elkland Leather Co., 3
C. C. H. Labor Law Serv. 116o,037 (C. C. A. 3d, i94o).
7. ".

.

.

we do not believe that the

. .

.

finding unconstitutionally abridges

the respondent's freedom of speech. Freedom of speech is a qualified right, not an
absolute right. The Act requires the employer to refrain from acts that interfere, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self organization and collective bargaining. The guarantee of such rights to the employees would indeed be
wholly ineffective if the employer, under the guise of exercising his constitutional right
of free speech, were free to coerce them into refraining from exercising the rights guaranteed them in the Act. . . ." Rockford Mitten & Hosiery Co., I6 N. L. R. B. No.
53 (939).
See Note (1938) Free Speech and the N. L. R. B., 7 Int. Jurid. Ass'n
Bull. 25.
8. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 3o9 U. S. 626 (1940).
9. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 309 U. S. 626 (940).

Io. Pound, Equitable Relief againstDefamation and Injuries to Personality (I916)
26 HARv. L. Ray. 640. Many labor cases in which injunctions have been granted have
been overruled in effect by the passage of the NoiRus LA GUARDIA AcT, 47 STAT. 70
(1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § ioi (Supp. 1940), but they still remain as precedents for the
restraint of speech issue. Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418
(1911). This is true even today. Miller's, Inc. v. Tailors Union, 15 A. (2d) 824
(N. J. I94o).
ii. Sec. 8 (I) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to

".

.

.

inter-

fere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right . . . [to self
organization]". Since the constitutionality of the Act has been established by N. L.
R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. I (i937) the employees have a right
to be free from employer interference which in theory rises as high as his constitutional
right of free speech. There is no question that other activity of the employer which
results in "interference" is an unfair labor practice. N. L. R. B. v. Pa. Greyhound
Lines, 303 U. S. 261 (938) (threats) ; N. L. R. B. v. Friedman-Marks Clothing Co.,
301 U. S. 58 (1937) (espionage and surveillance) ; N. L. R. B. v. Globe Cotton Mills,
io3 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) (refusal to bargain) ; N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood
Co., 98 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) (individual employment contracts) ; Clover Fork
Coal Co. v. N. L. R. B., 97 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) (direct opposition) ; N. L.

394

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

on the employer's subjective intent ignores the practicalities of the situation, 2 especially since the Board has not interpreted the Act to prohibit an
employer from discussing unionization with third persons, 13 or from
addressing his employees on the more important matters of hours and
wages of work. So long as legislation exists defining economic coercion as
an unfair labor practice on the part of the employer, 14 but permitting it to
be used by the employee, 15 it is questionable to attempt, as does the court,
to ascribe to both the same quantum of right to make public the facts of
an industrial dispute. 16 Because the record disclosed but few discriminatory discharges, the court may well have felt that this was the time to curb
arbitrary administrative action. But a requirement of specific support for
the finding of coercion 'I would have been as sufficient a safeguard as the
resort to the constitutional limitation.'
Be this as it may, only with the
gradual development of strong collective bargaining organizations which
can effectively withstand employer opinion, should the problem cease to
be critical.
R. B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) (strikebreaking);
West Texas Utilities Co., 22 N. L. R. B. No. 24 (1940) (elections) ; General Motors
Corp., 14 N. L. R. B. 113 (1939) (intimidation); Harlan Fuel Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 25
(1938) (attacks on organizers) ; S & K Knee Pants Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 940 (1937)
(runaway shop); Vegetable Oil Products Co., I N. L. R. B. 989 (1936) (economic
coercion). For a key as to how the Supreme Court balances conflicting liberties, see
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 309 U. S. 6 54 (194o).
12. The Supreme Court's interpretation of language in the RAILWAY LABOR ACT,

44 STAT. 578 (I926), 45 U. S. C. A. § 152 (Supp. 1940) lends weight to the Board's
position. Va. Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 (1937), aff'g, 84 F. (2d)
641 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936); Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Bros. of Ry. & Steamship Clerks,
281 U. S. 548 (I93O).

13. Muskin Shoe Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 1 (1938) (cease and desist order only from
distributing the literature among the employees, and not from distributing it to the
general public).
14. NATIONAL LA.OR RELATioNs ACt, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 151
(Supp. 1940).
15. NoRius-LA GUARDIA Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932),

29 U. S. C. A. § ioi (Supp.
1940).
16. Under the doctrine of Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940). As much
controversy has arisen over this case as over the instant case. Note (1940) 39 Micla.
L. REv. 11o. The court in the Thornhill case declared violative of the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech a legislative pronouncement making all picketing, regardless of character, number of persons involved, or area of activity, unlawful. The
instant court interpreted it to give to both employer and employee the coextensive right
to make public the facts of a labor dispute. But there are a number of essential distinctions. It is one thing to declare invalid an act of the legislature; but there is no
justification that a court decree in the nature of a cease and desist order which is designed to specific circumstances would likewise be set aside. Then again, there is no
law saying that it is an unfair practice to put economic pressure on an employer to
induce him toward a certain course of conduct, but the Wagner Act specifically gives to
employees protection from employer interference. In the last analysis, it is the difference between using speech to accomplish a lawful act, and using it to accomplish an
unlawful one. Moreover in Gregory, Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech
(1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 7o9, the writer makes the observation that the Thornhill case
has gone too far. If this be so, then clearly it should not serve as precedent for a decision here.

17. ".

.

. the distinction between the exercise by an employer of his right of

freedom of speech, and the actual use of the spoken word as an instrumentality to overpower the will of employees is well understood and constitutes the dividing line between
what an employe may do and what he may not do. It may, of course, be difficult to
determine in a particular case in which side of the line the activities of a particular
employer fall, for this must be left to the trier of fact if there is room for conflicting
inferences." Wis. L. R. B. v. Reuping Leather Co., 228 Wis. 473, 279 N. W. 673
(1938).
I8. See Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts (1938) 47 'YALE L. J. 519.
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Procedure-Compulsory Joinder of Insurer as Partial Subrogee
under Loan Agreement with Insured-Action by the insured for damages to his automobile caused by the defendant's alleged negligence. Under
a fifty dollar deductible collision policy, insurer advanced the amount
due as a loan' without interest, repayable only in the event of and
to the extent of any net recovery from defendant. The action is being
prosecuted under insurer's control. Defendant moved to have insurer
joined as a party plaintiff. Held, motion granted. The advance amounted
to a payment under the policy. To that extent insurer was subrogated to
the rights of the insured. 2 The insurer and insured are therefore, united in
interest and must be joined as parties plaintiff.3 Scarborough v. Bartholomew, 22 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 635 (Surr. Ct. i94O).
Where the insurance does not completely cover the loss, many code
states hold that the insured is the only real party in interest; that suit must
therefore, be prosecuted in his name only.4 The better view is that the
insurer, being subrogated to the extent of payment on the loss, is a real
party in interest and must be joined with the insured as a necessary party
plaintiff.5 Under the latter view,8 the use of the loan receipt device has
been upheld as a loan in cases where a common carrier required the shipper
to sign a bill of lading which included a provision that any insurance taken
out by the shipper should enure to the carrier's benefit.7 In these cases,
if the loan had been held to amount to a payment, thereby subrogating the
insurer, the loss would have been shifted from the carrier, who should bear
I. See instant case at 636 for the terms of the loan agreement.
Sisson v. Hassett, 155 Misc. 667, 28o N. Y. Supp. 148 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
3. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT (Cahill, 1931) §§ 194, 210. Section 210 provides that the
2.

suit must be brought in the name of the real party in interest. By subrogation, insurer

becomes a real party in interest to the extent of his payment on the loss. As the loss
is not fully covered by the payment, the insured still has an interest in the claim.
Therefore, both are united in interest and under section 194 must be joined. They are
both necessary parties plaintiff. CARMODY, MANUAL OF NEw YORKc PRAcnca (Rev.
ed. 1938) §§ 167, 168, i69. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) §§ 22, 24, 57.
4. Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N. C. 290, 88 S. E. 430 (916) ; see
cases cited in CLARK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 112, n. 96; SImES, The Real Party in
Interest (1922) io Ky. L. J. 6o, at 68. Clark points out that this conception is based
on a fallacious transference of the legal objection to splitting a cause of action and
allowing partial assignees to sue, to code practice, where it was intended that the
equitable rules of procedure would be fused with the legal. In equity partial assignees
or subrogees could be made parties. CLARK, op. cit. mpra note 3, at 11o. Some jurisdictions hold that the insured sues alone as trustee of an express trust for the benefit
of the insurer. Watson v. Travellers Mut. Casualty Co., x46 Kan. 623, 73 P. (2d) 64
(937) ; see Harrington v. Central States Fire Ins. Co. of Wichita, Kan., 169 Okla.
255, 257, 36 P. (2d) 738, 740 (1934), 96 A. L. R. 859, 864. Contra: Broderick v.
Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co., 86 Wash. 399, 15o Pac. 66 (1915).
5. Associated Truck Lines v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. of Boston, 275 Mich. 74,
265 N. W. 78o (1936) ; Moore v. Taylor, 175 App. Div. 37, 161 N. Y. Supp. 481 (3d
Dep't 1916) ; Pratt v. Radford, 52 Wis. 114, 8 N. W. 6o6 (i8i)
; cf. Henderson v.
Park Central Motors Service, Inc., 138 Misc. 183, 244 N. Y. Supp. 409 (Sup. Ct.
i93o) (No question of joinder). CLARK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 11o; Note (1940) 89
U. OF PA. L. REV. 218, at 224.
6. New York applies this conception. Moore v. Taylor, 175 App. Div. 37, I61 N.
Y. Supp. 480 (3d Dep't i916).
7. Luckenbach v. W. J. McCahan Sugar Refining Co., etc., 248 U. S. 139, 1 A. L.
R. 1522, 1528 (1918). The "loan receipt" was devised to avoid shifting the loss from
the carrier who was a common law insurer. Brandeis rationalized the holding by saying that the device was consonant both with the needs of commerce and the demands
of justice. This is not necessarily true in the instant case. The decisions following
the Luckenbach case consistently uphold the device as a loan when the question of the
common carrier as a defendant is present. The Seatrain-Havana, 103 F. (2d) 772, 774
(C. C. A. 2d, 1939) ; Dejean v. Louisiana Western R. R. Co., ii8 So. 822 (La. 1928) ;
Adler v. Bush Terminal Co., i6i Misc. 509, 291 N. Y. Supp. 435 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; Lee
v. Barett, 82 Misc. Rep. 475, 144 N. Y. Supp. 941 (N. Y. City Ct. 1913).
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the loss, 8 back to the insurer. Recognition of the loan as such had a practical basis in so far as it was the only way the insurer could pay the loss
immediately without losing the benefit of the insured's claim against the
carrier. 9 But, where, as in the instant case, subrogation would not result
ir the shifting of the loss from defendant back to the insurer, there is no
real objection to piercing the form of this loan agreement and holding that
it actually amounted to a payment of the loss, 10 other than the possible
prejudice to the value of the claim against the defendant if it were known
to a jury that plaintiff was insured or that insurer was a party plaintiff."
This possible loss in value to the claim is not enough to force the insurer to
withhold payment until insured's suit against defendant is ended in view of
the greater danger to insurer's interest if the insured retains the right of
action against defendant, for the insured could execute a release or might
conduct the suit in a manner detrimental to insurer's interest. 1 2 And more
important than this risk of loss, is the enforcement of the well recognized
policy of avoiding circuity of action and multiplicity of suits by requiring
those united in interest to join as parties plaintiff in order to settle all the
controversies arising out of defendant's wrong in a single suit.18
Real Property-Transferee's Immunity for Grantor's Breach of
Covenant Running with the Land-As part of his covenant with
plaintiff to build a common private road on their adjoining properties, A
8. At common law a common carrier was under an insurer's liability to the shipper for any losses in transit. Instant case at 638.
9. Under the bill of lading, insured would have to credit moneys received from the
insurer against carrier's liability to the insured.
io. Simpson v. Hartranft, 157 Misc. 387, 283 N. Y. Supp. 754 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
Sisson v. Hassett, 155 Misc. 667, 28o N. Y. Supp. 148 (Sup. Ct. 1935). Contra: Eber
Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, 3o F. Supp. 412, 414
(S. D. N. Y. 1939); Buffalo Foundry & Machine Co. v. S. M. Frank & Co., 171 Misc.
999, 14 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 327 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Ash v. Rhodes, 5 N. Y. Supp. (2d)
939 (1938) ; Molnar and Morgenroth v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 153 Misc. 38, 274
N. Y. Supp.

329

(N. Y. City Ct. 1934) ; Zaidens v. Salter, I42 Misc. 439, 254 N. Y.

Supp. 6o2, 6o4 (N. Y. City Ct. 1932)

;

cf. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Spring-

field Dyeing Co., Inc., io9 F. (2d) 533, 537 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).

These cases are all

distinguishable from the Luckenbach case which they cite as controlling authority.
They do not involve a carrier's common law insurer's liability. It is submitted that
these courts have not recognized the distinction suggested in the text.
ii. The policy of withholding from the jury information that the plaintiff or defendant is insured is well recognized. See Ash v. Rhodes, 5 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 939, 940
(Bing. City Ct. 1938) ; accord, Kromback v. Killian, 215 App. Div. 89, 213 N. Y. Supp.
138, 141 (2d Dep't 1925) (Involves section 193 (2) of the N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT).

But in the instant case, there is no way to avoid revealing the fact that plaintiff is insured. Sisson v. Hassett, 155 Misc. 667, 28o N. Y. Supp. 148, 152 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
12. By subrogation the insurer is vested absolutely with a proportionate share of
the claim. A release by the insured would not affect insurer's right. See Sisson v.
Hassett, 155 Misc. 667, 28o N. Y. Supp. 148, i5o (Sup. Ct. 1935).
13. If the loan agreement should be upheld as such, a release by the insured or
failure of the insured to live up to the agreement as to the prosecution of the suit would
necessitate two suits instead of the single suit made possible by the instant decision.
Home Ins. Co. v. Bernstein, 172 Misc. 763, I6 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 45 (N. Y. City Ct.
1939) (Release given by defendant insured in violation of loan agreement) ; Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Eastern Machinery Co., 63 Ohio App. 203, 25 N. E. (2d)
954 (939) (Insured fails to sue under agreement; is now a defendant in a contract
action brought by insurer under loan agreement). In support of this policy is the case
of Simpson v. Hartranft, 157 Misc. 387, 283 N. Y. Supp. 754, 757 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
See also Barnhill v. Brown, 58 Ohio App. 188, 16 N. E. (2d) 478 (937) semble. The
latter case holds that the insurer may be brought in on motion, not because insurer
is a necessary party, but as a proper party, a correct result, but questionable reasoning.
The instant case at 639 holds that such a loan as the one here presented is a violation
of section 16 of the old Insurance Law-section 83 of the new Insurance Law; that such
a loan is void. Section 83, however, applies to loans on life insurance policies.
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built a bridge on his land.1 The cost of maintenance was to be borne
equally, but A did not contribute to the replacement of the bridge after
destruction. Plaintiff brought action against A and the defendant, who had
through several conveyances become tenants by the entireties, for their
share of the cost and, upon A's death, elected to proceed against the defendant. 2 Counsel stipulated that the title to the land contained a "covenant
running with the land to maintain and rebuild a bridge." ' Held, "grantee",
being liable by virtue of privity of estate only, is not liable for her predecessor's breach. Conti v. Duve, 15.A. (2d) 494 (Pa. Super. 194o).
As there was no privity between the original covenantors, it is improbable, except in a few jurisdictions, that the covenants would, in the absence
of a stipulation by counsel, be deemed to "run with the land".4 Where the
covenant runs, a transferee of the covenantee has no right of action for
beraches which took place prior to the transfer; 5nor is a transferee of the
covenantor liable for breaches of the covenant by either his predecessor or
his successor.6 The court repeated the usual statement that once the coveI. It was said in the agreed statement of the facts that the bridge was to be built at
the owner's expense. Agreed Statement of Facts, Brief for Appellants, p. ia. But see
contrary statement in the opinion at p. 494.
2. A's first wife X entered into the written agreement (whether under seal or not
does not appear) with plaintiff and two other adjoining owners in fee, and A joined in
the agreement. The bridge was vrashed out after X's death and after the transfer of
her land to A. Plaintiff built the new bridge, recovered half of the cost from the two
other covenantors and joined them as plaintiffs to his use in his action against A and
A's second wife, the defendant. See Agreed Statement of Facts, Brief for Appellants.
No. 281, April Term, i94o.
3. The lower court held that the covenant ran with the land because it was recited
that the way was for the common use of the parties, "their heirs and assigns," and "the
parties intended that responsibility for the maintenance of the road and bridge should
extent beyond those who originally entered into the agreement." Unreported opinion,
C. P. of Allegheny County (1939) ; Brief for Appellants, p. 6a. But the intent of the
parties, while it is a necessary requirement, is not the only one. Gibson v. Holden, 115
Ill. 199, 3 N. E. 282 (1885) ; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 854. But cf.
78.
This question was eliminated on appeal by stipulation of counsel. They also spedfled that the covenant to maintain was a covenant to maintain and rebuild.
4. Such covenant clearly "touches and concerns" both lands and, in the absence of
an intention to the contrary, will be held to run; cf. Batavia Mfg. Co. v. Newton
Wagon Co., 91 IIl. 230 (1878); Hight v. McCulloch, 15o Tenn. 117, 263 S. W. 794
(1924).
But in the absence of a leasehold it is generally held that there must be some
"privity" between the original parties, at least a grantor-grantee relationship. See
PHILBRICK, PROPERTY (1939) 303; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §851.
But see CLARK, REAL COVENANTS (1929) 91. However, in the instant case the transferee probably knew of the existence of the covenants and one of the strong objections
to the running of the burden would not be present.
The Pennsylvania courts are willing to make exceptions to the general rule that
there must be some "privity" between the original parties; Horn v. Miller, 136 Pa. 640,
654, 2o Atl. 706, 707 (189o) ; Lindeman v. Lindsey, 69 Pa. 93 (187). Relying upon
these decisions the lower court held that the covenant ran with the land, without even
discussing "privity." Unreported opinion, C. P. of Allegheny County (1939), Brief
for Appellants, p. 6a. If the covenant runs where there is no "privity", it is illusory
to hold, as the higher court did, that the grantee is liable "by virtue of privity of
estate only"; unless this means privity of estate with his grantor. See CLARK, REAL
CLARK, REAL COVENANTS (1929)

COVENANTS (1929)

91, 95.

5. Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Seidel, 147 Pa. 232, 23 Atl. 56o, 563 (1892);
Crane v. Batten, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 137 (Q. B. 1854) ; Johnson v. Churchwardens,
4 A. & E. 520, III Eng. Rep. 883 (K. B. 1836); Lewes v. Ridge, Cro. Eliz. 863, 78
Eng. Rep. 1o89 (C. B. 16Ol). But there is a modern tendency to disregard this rule
with respect to covenants for title because of the manifest injustice involved in the
denial of a cause of action to the grantee who suffers a total loss of his rights in the
land; 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § io22.
6. Union Trust Co. v. Rosenburg, 171 Md. 409, 189 Atl. 421 (937); Mason v.
Smith, 131 Mass. 51o (1881) ; Dananberg v. Reinheimer, 24 Misc. 712, 53 N. Y. Supp.
794 (Sup. Ct. 1898). See Townsend v. Scholey, 42 N. Y. 18 (1870). Tillotson v.
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nant is broken, a cause of action arises and the covenant ceases to run,7 but
this dictum is qualified in that a covenant ceases to run only insofar as it
has been exhausted by the breach.8 Moreover, if the breach is a "continuing" one, such as failure to maintain or to keep in repair, the transferee is
liable (or has a right of action).9 There was in the instant case such a
continuing breach until construction of the new bridge; it can be assumed
that the landowner then became obligated to pay his share of the cost within
a reasonable time, and such an obligation to do an act within a period of
time is capable of but one breach. 10 The propriety of the decision thus
depends upon the exact time of the breach, and as the court assumed that
it took place before the defendant acquired any interest in the land 11 it
logically concluded that the action must fail. 12 Some courts, however,
might have been inclined to find an assumption of liability on the part of
the transferee. 1 3 Nevertheless, the decision seems equitable, for the defendant had not been unjustly enriched since the new bridge was part of the
realty she acquired; moreover, the covenantee was not left without a
remedy since he bad a cause of action against the transferor's estate.

Sales-Representation of Manufacturer on Sealed Goods as Warranty of Retailer-Customer, while ordering her usual brand of mascara, asked retailer's salesgirl whether it was safe. The salesgirl answered
Boyd, 4 Sandf. 516 (N. Y. I851); Lingle Water User's Ass'n v. Occidental Building
and Loan Ass'n, 43 Wyo. 41, 297 Pac. 385 (93)

; Churchwardens v. Smith, 3 Burr.

97 Eng. Rep. 827 (K. B. 1762) ; Grescot v. Green, I Salk. 198, 91 Eng. Rep. 179
(K. B. 1700) ; Brittin v. Vaux, I Lut. 36o, 125 Eng. Rep. 189 (C. B. 1700) ; BROWN,

1271,

COVENANTS RUNNING WITH LAND (1907) 50; SIMS, COVENANTS OTHER THAN COVENANTS FOR TITLE (IgOI) 95; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 131.

7. At p. 496; cf. Mirick v. Bashford, 38 Barb. 1gi (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1862) ; Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Seidel, z47 Pa. 232, 23 Atl. 560 (1892).
8. 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (Igo) § I94e (4). Covenants which are
capable of a "continuing" breach would not be exhausted by one breach. The same is
true of those capable of "recurring" breach, e. g., calling for the doing of acts periodically.
9. Gerzebek v. Lord, 33 N. J. L. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1869) ; Bennett v. Herring, 3 C. B.
N. S. 370 (1857); Martyn v. Clue, 18 Q. B. 659, ii8 Eng. Rep. 249 (1852); Mascals
Case, I Leon. 62, 74 Eng. Rep. 58 (C. B. 1587).
As to the distinction between "entire" and "continuing" covenants see McGlynn
v. Moore, 25 Cal. 384 (1864); Stuyvesant v. Mayor of New York, Ii Paige 414
(1845) ; Wilson v. Demos, i85 Wis. 42, 2oo N. W. 673, 674 (1924).
1o. Coffin v. Talman, 8 N. Y. 465 (1853); Astor v. Hoyt, 5 Wend. 603 (N. Y.
i83o); Morris v. Kennedy, (1896) 2 Ir. R. 247; Doyle v. Hart, L. R. 4 Ir. 455
(1878). See Spoor v. Green, L. R. 9 Exch. 99 (1874) ; Coward v. Gregory, L. R. 2
C. P. 153 (i866).
See also Hendrix v. Dickson, 69 Mo. App. 197 (1897). The
cases most frequently mention covenants to erect a building within a certain time, or
within a reasonable time, and covenants to put in repair as distinguished from covenants to keep in repair. In Washington N. Gas Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. 576, I6 Atl.
799 (i889), upon which the instant court relied, there was a covenant to drill an oil
well within a stated period, which period had elapsed when the assignee took the land.
ii. As the transferee in the instant case was probably a donee who took joint title
to the land with knowledge of the breach, the court might have liberally determined
the "reasonable time" and it may well be that the covenant would not have been broken
until after the defendant's second wife acquired an interest in the land.
12. This holding is undoubtedly correct as a matter of law. Appellants contended
that the transferee was being unjustly enriched because of the presence on her land
of the bridge which she had not paid for and without which she would have no access
to the highway. Brief for Appellants, p. 5. But the bridge was there when she took
the land-and it was part of her bargain. Unless the covenant was broken in her time,
Plaintiff has no cause of action against her.
13. See Pew v. Buchanan, 72 Iowa 637, 34 N. W. 453 (1887) ; Fountain v. Shulenberg Lumber Co., 1O9 Mo. 55, i8 S. W. 1147 (1892); Woodland Oil Co. v. Crawford, 55 Ohio St. I6l, 44 N. E. io93 (1896).
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that the tube was marked "harmless", whereupon the customer bought it.
Her eye was injured through its use, and she sued retailer for breach of
express warranty.1 The jury was instructed that sale of the tube marked
with manufacturer's warranty was evidence which might show an express
warranty by retailer. Held, the instruction was not erroneous. Beckett v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 28 N. E. (2d) 8o4 (Ill. App. 194o).
The Uniform Sales Act 2 defines an express warranty as any affirmation of fact by the seller relating to goods, if its natural tendency is to
induce the purchaser to buy the goods, and if the purchaser buys the goods
relying thereon. It is doubtful whether the sale of an article marked with
its manufacturer's warranty should be interpreted as an express warranty
of the retailer, inasmuch as this situation is provided for in Section 15.'
Many courts hold retailers absolutely liable for imperfections in sealed
foods and drugs on the theory of implied warranty.4 They argue that the
customer should have an easily available defendant to sue; 5 that good retail
conditions are promoted by compelling retailers to buy from dependable
manufacturers; 6and that no injury is done the retailer, since he can indemnify himself against his manufacturer. 7 Other courts, in denying such
recovery, maintain that there can be no warranty implied on sealed goods
because the customer knows that the retailer has no opportunity to inspect
them; 8 and that the retailer, who is without fault, should not be penalized
I. The case was argued on the theory of express warranty. Plaintiff thought
that the provision in the Uniform Sales Act that there shall be no warranty of fitness
implied in the case of specified goods sold under a trade name would defeat an action
on implied warranty. IWt. Rxv. STAT. (Jones' Cahill, 1933) c. 121a ff 18 § 15 (4),
UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15 (4). Some courts, including the instant one, have implied
a warranty of fitness in spite of Section 15 (4). Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115
Conn. 249, x61 Atl. 385 (1932); Bowman v. Woodway Stores, 258 Ill. App. 307
(193o), rev'd on other grounds in 345 Ill. 110, 177 N. E. 727 (1931) ; Ward v. Great

Other courts have held
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 231 Mass. 9o, 12o N. E. 225 (918).
that although a warranty of fitness will not be implied in such case, the retailer is still
liable on an implied warranty of merchantability. UNIFORM SALES Acr § 15 (2).
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. iO5 (1q31); Dow

Drug Co. v. Nienan, 57 Ohio App. 19o, 13 N. E. (2d) 130 (1936).
2. ILL. RLV. STAT. (Jones' Cahill 1933) C. 12ia ff I5 § 12, UNIFORM
§ 12.
3. ILI. REv. STAT. (Jones' Cahill 1933) c. I2ia
ff 18

§

§ 15.

SALES ACr

i5, UNIFORM SAILS Acr

4. Cleary v. First Nat'l Stores, 291 Mass. 172, 196 N. E. 868 (935) ; Griffin v.
Jas. Butler Co., io8 N. J. L. 92, 156 At1. 636 (1q3i); Giminez v. Great Ati. & Pac.
Tea Co., 264 N. Y. 39o, 191 N. E. 27 (1934). Though the rule began with regard to
canned foods, it has been extended to drugs and tobacco. Bianchi v. Denholm &
McKay Co., ig N. E. (:d) 697 (Mass. 1939) (face cream) ; Sicard v. Kremer, 133
Ohio St. 291, 13 N. E. (:d) 250 (1938) (hair dye); Driver v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,
58 Ohio App. 299, I6 N. E. (2d) 548 (1938) (mascara); Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman,
57 Ohio App. 19o, 13 N. E. (2d) 130 (1936) (explosive cigar) ; Delk v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 18o S. C. 463, 186 S. E. 383 (1936) (chewing tobacco).
5. Often the manufacturer lives in a distant jurisdiction, and a suit against him
would impose great inconvenience on the customer. See Burkhardt v. Armour &
Co., 115 Conn. 249, 262, 161 At. 385, 9o (1932). Sometimes the consumer can not
tell from the container who the manufacturer is. Ward v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 231 Mass. 9o, 94, 12o N. E. 225, 226 (1918); Walker v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 131 Tex. 57, 61, 112 S. W. (2d) 170, 172 (1938).
6. Ward v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 12o N. E. 225 (1918);
SALES (931) 466; Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food

VOLD,

Products (1939)

23 MINN. L. REV. 585, 6o6.
7. Ward v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 231 Mass. 9o, 12o N. E. 225 (i918);
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105 (1931) ; 2 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 614a.
8. Bigelow v. Maine Central, iio Me. 105, 85 At. 396 (1912) ; Kroger Co. v.
Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933) ; Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 117
W. Va. 68o, I86 S. E. 61o (1936). But see I WILIsToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924) §242.
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for the customer's convenienceY It appears that the arguments for the
former view are the stronger, especially in states where adequate relief
against the manufacturer is denied the customer. 10 The Illinois courts
have long favored this view,'- and though the instant case uses the language
of express warranty, it is obvious that it is thinking in terms of implied
warranty in order to achieve a desirable result.1 2 In view of the unequivocal
terms of the Sales Act, it might have been more logical to reverse the judgment of the court below. Even without the instruction objected to, plaintiff might well have succeeded on the ground that the salesgirl's words
amounted to an express warranty binding on defendant through agency

principles."3

Torts-Privilege of Tenant to Induce Breach of Rent Contract by
Other Tenants-Defendant, a tenant of the plaintiff, organized other
tenants into an association whose members refused to pay rent, admittedly
a breach of contract,' in order to force the landlord to fulfill his obligations
under the leases. In a suit to enjoin the defendant from doing anything
intended to cause continued non-payment of rent and to recover damages
for her inducing breach of contract held for plaintiff; on the absence of an
affirmative duty on the defendant, mere community of interest between
her and the other tenants was no justification. Camden Nominees, Ltd. v.
Forcey, [194o] i Ch. 352.
Unlike the law of libel and slander, 2 privilege to induce breach of contract 3 is determined, not by clearly defined rules of law, easily applied to
9. See Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making (1936) 34 MICH.

L. RM. 494, 514.

io. "It is much safer to hold that the vendor is liable than it would be to compel
the purchaser to assume the risk, which would mean, as in this instant case, that the
plaintiff would be without remedy for the loss of the sight in the right eye." Instant
case at 8og. The court does not say why plaintiff would be without a remedy. It
appears that she could recover from the manufacturer for negligence. See Davis v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 II. App. 355 (1912); cf. Miller v. Sears, Roebuck &
It is not clear whether she could recover from him on a
Co., 250 Ill. 340 (1928).
warranty. See Salmon v. Libby, 219 Ill. 421, 76 N. E. 573 (19o6). For a complete
discussion of the law on retailer's liability in the different states, see Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food Products (939) 23 MINN. L. REv. 585.
ii. In Chapman v. Roggenkamp, 182 Ill. App. 117 (1913),

the court held a

retailer of canned goods liable on the ground that the public health required it. It
cited Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N. E. 210 (1898) to support this holding,
although the latter case held the retailer liable because he was able to inspect the
unpacked meat which injured plaintiff. The Chapman case was followed for the
same reasons of public policy in Sloan v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 193 Ill. App. 62o
(1915) and Bowman v. Woodway Stores, 258 Ill. App. 307 (I93O), rev'd on other
grounds in 345 Ill. 110, 177 N. E. 727 (931).

12. See quotation from the opinion of the court in the instant case, note 9 supra.
As to which result is the more desirable, compare Waite, Retail Responsibility and
Judicial Law Making (1936) 34 MicH. L. REV. 494 with Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealersfor Defective Food Products (1939) 23 MINN. L. REv. 585.
a
13. In Smith v. Denholm & McKay, 288 Mass. 234, 192 N. E. 631 (934)
statement made by a saleswoman that a cosmetic cream was harmless was held
admissible as a basis for an express warranty where the saleswoman had apparent
authority.

I. Defendant conceded that it was "no answer to a claim of rent for the tenant
to say that the landlord has not performed his obligation to clean the staircase or
furnish hot water." Instant case at 356.
2. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 767, comment a.
3. On the general question of privilege to induce breach of contract see Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 728, 746;
Notes (1932) 17 CORN. L. Q. 516, (1935) MICH. L. REV. 943. The application of
this privilege to the field of labor law is not considered here because the social policy
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specific fact situations, but rather by an evaluation of the particular conflicting interests in the individual case. 4 The instant case attempts to apply
a more objective standard " by making the existence of an affirmative duty
on the part of the defendant determinative of privilege.6 A comparison of
the Brinelow case 7 in which a protective association was allowed' to
induce breach of contract for the benefit of non-members, with the Glamorgan case 9 in which that privilege was denied union officials acting for the
admitted benefit of their own members, indicates how meaningless 10 the
use of the word "duty" 11 may become. It is felt that the English court
might well have rejected any single factor 12 as determinative, and followed
in that branch of tort law is so different as to make the separation desirable. See
(1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 754, 756 n. 7 and scope notes to chapters 37 and 38,
RESTATEmENT, TORTS (1939).

It is to be noted that in the instant case Simonds J. in his purportedly complete
review of English cases involving privilege to induce breach of contract makes no
mention of the leading case of Said v. Butt [I92O] 3 K. B. 497, which involved the
liability of an agent for inducing breach of contract by his principal. For a similar
separation of the problem of privilege and that of the agency relationship in this
connection see SALMOND, TORTS (7th ed. 1928) § 159 (4), (s). But see (1940) 89
U. OF PA. L. REV. 250.

For an analysis of the difference between privilege to induce breach of contract
and privilege to induce refusal to deal and a discussion of the available authorities see
(1939) 16 PRoc. A. L. I. 14o. This distinction was not clearly drawn in a discussion
of the instant case in (1940) 56 Scar. L. REv. 112.
4. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (939) § 767 and comments thereto. See Bowen L. J.
in Mogul Steamship Co. Ltd. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 598, 618 (1889) quoted in
Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation [1903] 2 K. B. 545, 574 and
in the instant case at 362. For a strong approval of this situation see Note (1926) 39
HAmv. L. REv. 749, 751; cf. Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent (I894) 8 HAav. L.
REv. 1, 3.
5. See Holmes, loc. cit. supra note 4, at 7.
6. Instant case at 365, 366.
7. Brimelow v. Casson [1924] I Ch. 302, commented on in Notes (925) 73 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 291, 293, 23 Micir. L. REV. 518. In that case plaintiff had been paying
starvation wages so that the actresses had to resort to immorality to earn enough to
live on. Defendant induced theatre owners to violate their contracts and refuse to
allow plaintiff's troupe to perform. In denying liability Russel J. said, "These defendants, as it seems to me, owed a duty to their calling and to its members, and I am
tempted to add, to the public . . ."
8. Compare Simonds J. in the instant case at 366, "I would humbly suggest that
on the facts stated in the judgment that case [Brimelow v. Casson] might have been
simply disposed of by the application of the maxim Ex turpi causa . .

."

with what

Holmes wrote nearly a half century before, "Therefore decisions for or against
privilege . . . often are presented as hollow deductions from empty propositions like
,sic utere . . .'"

Holmes, loc. cit. supra note 4 at 3.

9. Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation [9o3] 2 K. B. 545.
In that case liability was imposed for the calling of "stop days", in violation of
agreements, in order to keep up the price of coal. In affirming ([2905] A. C. 239),
Lord Lindley, at 254, denied any duty on defendant by reasoning that breach of contract was illegal and "a legal duty to do what is illegal and known to be so is a contradiction in terms". To the same effect see comment on the instant case in (1940)
56 LAW. Q. REV. 3o3. This circuitous reasoning of itself vitiates the "duty" test.
io. Determining the boundaries of "moral duty" is so dependent on outside considerations as to make the use of the phrase little more than a front for unexpressed
factors.
iI. Compare the use of the term "duty" in defamation. See Jones, Intent and
Duty in Relation to Qualified Privilege (1924) 22 MIcH. L. REV. 437, especially
at 444.
22. In privilege to induce breach of contract, as compared with defamation, "the
competing interests are more nearly at a balance; the factors of policy giving rise to
justification must accordingly be more numerous and varied." Note (1926) 39 HAmv.
L. REV. 749, 751.
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Romer, L.

J.,1" whose

analysis is identical with that of the Restatement' 4

in considering and evaluating such factors as the grounds for the breach,

the object of the defendant,' 5 the means employed, her relation to the other

tenants, 1 6 and the social interest in protecting the defendant's freedom of

action as contrasted with the possible damage to plaintiff.17

With this anal-

ysis the court could not have rejected as "dangerous" 18 any consideration
of the inequality of bargaining power between the parties, because, it is

submitted, such inequality is an indispensable factor 19 in evaluating the

2
public interests 20 involved. 1 In contrast to the instant case, American 22
courts of equity have even allowed picketing by tenants 23 in "rent strikes",

13. In Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation [1903] 2 K. B.
545, 574, aff'd [i9o5] A. C. 239, quoted in the instant case at 362. He listed as
meriting consideration the nature of the contract broken, the position of the parties
to the contract, the grounds for the breach, the means employed to procure the
breach, the relation of the person procuring the breach to the person who breaks the
contract, and the object of the person procuring the breach.
14. RESTATEmENT, TORTS (1939) §767. Important factors to be considered,
among others, are the nature of the actor's conduct, the nature of the expectancy
interfered with, the relations between the parties, the interest sought to be advanced
by the actor, and the social interests in protecting the expectancy on the one hand and
the actor's freedom of action on the other.
15. Compare the instant case at 366, holding that no inducement of a breach of
contract can be justified by defending on the ground of performance of a public
service, with Bohien's statement that "an act intended to invade another's legally
protected interest is privileged only if done to protect or advance some public interest . . ." Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 307, 314.
The court mentions the fact that defendant sought her own ends, for which a
privilege cannot be granted. It is submitted that there are interests of a defendant
for the protection of which he will be justified in inducing breach of contract.
Instance the case of inconsistent contracts made by X with A and B. Neither A nor
B will be liable for inducing breach of the other's contract. Instant case at 362;
cf. Winters v. University District Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 268 Ill.App. 247 (1932);
Knapp v. Penfield, 143 Misc. 132, 256 N. Y. Supp. 41 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; O'Brien v.
Western Union Telegraph, 62 Wash. 595, 1I4 Pac. 44I (1911). See Bohlen, loc. cit.
supra; Note (2935) 33 Micn. L. REv. 943. The problem would seem to be rather to
determine whether the interest of the defendant which she sought to protect (here a
contract right) was equal or superior to that of the plaintiff (also a contract right).
Cf. Carpenter, loc. cit. supra note 3 at 756 discussing the Glamorgan case.
I6. But see instant case at 365 where the relationship is considered only in
determining the existence of a duty.
17. See Carpenter, loc. cit. supra note 3, at 746.
18. Instant case at 366.
i9. "The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and social advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely by logic and the
general propositions of law which nobody disputes." Holmes, dissenting in Vegelahn
v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, io6, 44 N. E. 1077, io8o (1896).
20. See note i5, supra; cf. Note (1932) 17 CoRN. L. Q. 509, 514, pointing out
that legal contracts which are socially undesirable are not afforded protection in this
tort action, instancing yellow dog, marriage, and certain public utility contracts. See
id. n. 25, 28.
21. There is ample authority in the related field of labor law for recognizing
inequality of position as an important consideration in determining privilege. "Combination on the one side [capital] is patent and powerful. Combination on the other
is the necessary and desirable counterpart if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and
equal way." Holmes, dissenting in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 267 Mass. 92, 2o6, 44 N. E.
1077, 1O8O (1896). See (1934) Picketing in Non-Labor Disputes, 3 INT. JuRm.
Ass'N BuLL. No. 3, page i.
22. That the American view differs from the English on the problem of privilege
to induce breach of contract see instant case at 365, and comment thereon in (I94O)
i8 CAN. B. REV. 393, 396.
23. Barnes-Arrow Bldg. Corp. v. Hoffman, N. Y. L. J., March 6, 2933, page
1324 (Bronx Co. Sup. Ct.). In Birnbaum v. Margosian, id. at 2323 (Bronx Co. Sup.
Ct.) an injunction was granted forbidding non-tenants from picketing. See (1933)
Rent Strikes, 2 INT. JURID. Ass'N BUm.- No. 4, Page 3. Note that the picketing
necessarily involved attempt to induce breach of tenancy contracts.
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and in denying injunctions have refused to hold a tenant in this situation
liable for inducing breach of contract. 4 The difficulties attendant upon
each individual tenant's enforcing his rights at law 25 are such as to make
the adequacy 26 of such remedies questionable from a practical standpoint.
In view of this fact, and recognizing that adequate remedies on the contracts still remain open for the plaintiff, the result, as well as the reasoning,
of the instant case may well be questioned.
Trade Regulation-Application of Milk Control Statute to Consignment Contracts-The Pennsylvania Milk Control Statute I empowered a commission to prescribe wholesale and retail prices. Plaintiff
sought injunction to restrain commission from enforcing minimum prices 2
and bonding provisions I against him on the ground that by merely selling
milk as agent for the producer on a consignment basis he did not buy and
sell under the terms of the statute.4 Held (two justices dissenting), injunction granted since consignment agreements were not specifically regulated by the Act. Green v. Milk Control Commission, 16 A. (2d) 9 (Pa.
Sup. Ct. 1940).
That statutes conferring legislative authority to administrative boards
should be strictly construed is well settled.' Equally well established is
24. See opinion of McGoldrick J. in Barnes-Arrow Bldg. Corp. v. Hoffman,
N. Y. L. J., March 6, 1933, page 2324 (Bronx Co. Sup. Ct.). "Plaintiff claims that
• . . the tenants retained as their agents the members of a vaguely constituted organization; that those agents peaceably presented certain demands which for the
instant purpose will be assumed to be outrageous; that when the demand was refused
the defendants, in violation of the law which forbids anyone to interfere with a contract, do interfere with the contract of the plaintiff; . ... "
Injunction denied except
as to forbidding wilful waste. The value of this decision as authority may be questioned because of the absence of any consideration of privilege, as such, in the opinion.
25. The court in the instant case at 365 points out that the object sought was one
which could be reached by process of law. It is submitted that in determining privilege, the problem is not simply whether some legal remedy exists, but is rather a
balancing of the practicability or impracticability of court help as against the undesirability of the particular form of self help. Instance the privilege to forcibly
recapture chattels. HARPER, ToRTs (933) § V. Erle, C. J., in Blades v. Higgs, IO
C. B. (N. S.) 713 (1861) said, "if the owner was compellable by law to seek redress
by action for a violation of his right of property, the remedy would be often worse
than the mischief, and the law would aggravate the injury instead of redressing it."
26. The nature of the breach by the landlord (stairs not cleaned properly, water
not heated regularly) accentuates the difficulty of recovery by a tenant, and the cost
of suit compared to the damages which might be received would appear to be prohibitive. Furthermore, the tenancy being from month to month, a suit by a single
tenant might well result in his eviction.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 3r, § 700j-IO1 et seq.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 31, § 700j-8o3: "The Commission
shall fix . . . the minimum prices to be paid by milk dealers to producers for
milk...

3. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 3, § 7 00j- 5oI: "It shall be unlawful
for a milk dealer to purchase milk from producer unless the milk dealer shall file with
the commission corporate surety, individual surety, or collateral bond, approved by the
commission."
"Milk dealer" was defined in § 7ooj-103 as "any person . . . who purchases or
handles milk within the Commonwealth, for sale, shipment, storage, processing or manufacture, within or without the Commonwealth."
4. The plaintiff contended that he "paid" nothing as required in § 700j-8o3, note 2
supra, nor "purchased" anything as required in § 700j-5oi, note 3 supra, since he really
only received a commission for his services. The plaintiff maintained, therefore, that
under the consignment agreement, any payments that were made were actually by the
producers to the dealers. Brief for Appellees, p. 36, Green v. Milk Control Commission, 16 A. (2d) 9 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1940).
5. Swarthmore Borough v. Public Service Commission, 277 Pa. 472, 121 AtI. 488
(1923); Citizens Passenger Rwy. v. Public Service Commission, 271 Pa. 39, 54, 114
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the rule that legislation should be interpreted 6 to carry out the intent

7

of

the legislature.8 Consequently, these legalistic principles of construction
are of little assistance since they, together with other considerations, could
logically lead, as in the instant case, to opposite results.9 Milk control
statutes, although originally intended to protect the consumer from receiving impure milk, are today designed to assure the producer a reasonable price for his product. 10 Such laws "' have almost uniformly been
upheld 12 on the ground of an emergency," or as a valid exercise of the
police power,'" or as reasonable regulations of an industry affected with
the public interest. 5 Although a few statutes provide for "jobbing"
agreements,' no act specifically mentions consignment transactions.' 7 The
language of all the enactments seems to anticipate merely sales agreements
between producer and dealer. Although the term "purchase" was once
Atl. 642, 644 (1921). These cases, although cited by the majority opinion, are not
strictly applicable to the instant case since the purposes of delegating administrative
authority in the two situations are quite different. See dissenting opinion of instant
case at io.
6. No distinction is made in the discussion between "construing" and "interpreting"

a statute, although a difference is sometimes recognized. See U. S. v. Keitel,
370, 385 (19o8).
TIONAL

See also

SEDGwicK,

CoNsTRucrIoN

OF STATUTORY AND

211

U. S.

CONSTITU-

LAW (2d ed. 1874) 191.

7. For interesting and conflicting discussions as to the nature of legislative inter-

est see Sanawicx, op. cit. supra note 6, at 328; Horack, In the Name of Legislative
Inte tion (1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 119; Radin, Statutory Interpretation (193o) 43
HARv. L. REv. 863; Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation (193o) 43 HARv. L.
REv. 886.
8. CRAWFORD, THE CoNsTRucrION OF STATUTES (194o) § 238 at 452; ENDLICH,
INT=IRErATION OF STATUTES (1888) § 337.
9. While the majority of the court favored a strict construction, the dissent not
only urged a liberal interpretation, but likewise felt that consignment agreements were
amply provided for even by a strict interpretation. See instant case at ii.
io. Call, Legislative Control-of the Milk Industry (1935) 3 Gao. WASH. L. REv.
494ii. Milk control laws now exist in twenty states. Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Jersey and Wisconsin have provided expiration dates for their acts.
The remaining states have the so-called "permanent" type of statute. Milk control
statutes now operative are: Ala. Gen. Acts 1939, No. 164, p. 267; CAL. CODE AGRcI.
(Deering, 1937) § 735 et seq.; CAL. CODE AGRIC. (Deering, Supp. 1939) § 735.3 et seq.;
CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1935) c. IO7a, § 796c et seq.; CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp.
1939) c. Io7a, § 707e et seq.; Fla. Gen. Laws 1939, c. 19231, p. 446; Ga. Laws 1937,
No. 374, p. 247; IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, Supp. 1937) § 3647-4 et seq., amended
Ind. Acts 1939, c. 26, p. 67; Me. Laws (I935) c. 13, p. 210, amended Me. Laws (I939)

c. 138, p. 147; Mass. Acts (1934) c. 376, p. 538, amended Mass. Acts (I937) c. 428,
p. 551, amended Mass. Acts (938) c. 279, p. 247, amended Mass. Acts (I939) c. 302,
p. 301, c. 413, p. 488; 5 MIcH. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 5394-41 et seq.; Mont. Laws
1939, c. 204, p. 512; N. H. Laws 1937, c. 107, p. 139, amended N. H. Laws 1939, c. 146,

p. 157; N. J. Laws 1939, C.82, p. 136; N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1931-1935)
c. I, §§ 252-258(a); 5 ORE. CODE ANN. (1935) § 40-2001 et seq., amended Ore. Laws

1939, c. 197, p. 398; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 194o) tit. 31, § 700j-IOi et seq.;
R. I. GEN. LAWS, ANN. (1938) c. 215, p. 458, amended R. I. Public Laws 1939,
c. 731, p. 436, amended R. I. Public Laws I94O, c. 889, p. 550; VT. GEN. LAWS
(Spec. 1933) No. 8, p. 387; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) § 121x et seq., amended
Va. Laws 1940, c. 259, P. 415; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 64, p. 235, amended Wis. Laws
1935, c. 58, p. 1oo, amended Wis. Laws 1939, c. 512, p. 864.

12. For a reference to decisions holding milk control statutes unconstitutional
see Lyman, New State Legislation and Recent Amendments given before the 6th
Annual Meeting of the National Association of Milk Control Agencies, October 17,
1940.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921) ; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917).
Note (933) 42 YALE L. J. 1259, 1267.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
E. g. IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, Supp. 1937) § 3647-5(i).

17. A few acts provide for the regulation and bonding of any dealer including
a broker or an agent who handles or distributes milk received from the producer.
Such broad provisions might cover the consignment agreements. E. g. CAL. CODE

RECENT CASES
held to mean "acquired for marketing",18 in the instant case it was considered to exclude consignment arrangements.' 9 It is to be noted that it
was the farmer's traditional reluctance to act collectively, plus the effects
of an ever present milk surplus, combined with the pressure of economic
coercion by strongly organized distributors which necessitated this type
The situation created by the instant decision,
of legislative assistance. 2
2
particularly with the advent of the "flush" season in the spring, ' will
probably render the unprotected producer once again a victim of depressed
prices.' 2 Moreover, dealers actually operate on the credit of producers
since payments are customarily made to the producer only after considerable time following the dealer's final disposal of the milk. Consequently,
elimination of the bonding requirements leaves the producer susceptible
to fraud or defalcation by the dealer.23 Stabilization of prices is further
disrupted since other dealers, although willing to pay the prescribed prices,
will be forced by competition to resort to the consignment method in order
to reduce costs. Thus the power of the commission to fix retail prices to
assure dealers a reasonable return becomes valueless if unaccompanied by
the power to set wholesale rates. 24 Likewise, possibilities of interstate
cooperation on milk control problems are defeated and unwanted federal
regulation becomes the sole solution. 25 The suggested alternative of legislative amendment with all its practical difficulties affords some slight
comfort for curing the above troubles.2 6
Trusts-Effect of Anticipation Clause of Spendthrift Trust on
Allocation of Principal and Income-Trustee held corporate shares
upon which dividends had been declared. The life tenant died after the
declaration of the dividends, but before they were payable. The trust
instrument contained a spendthrift provision and a clause which provided
that payments of income were to be made only as the same "accrues" and
not by way of anticipation. In a suit by the remaindermen to prevent payment of the dividends to the executor of the life tenant the court held that
the anticipation clause did not affect the "vesting" of dividends. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., et al. (two cases), 15 A. (2d) 665
(Del. Ch. 194o).
From the time of its origin the anticipation clause has been looked upon
as restraint on voluntary alienation I for the purpose of protecting the life
AcRc. (Deering, Supp. i93g) §735.3(f); N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, Supp. ig31935) c. 1, § 253.
i8. U. S. v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 58o (1939).
ig. Instant case, at 9.
2o. Report of the New York Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk
Industry, April IO,1933.
21. In the spring season, due to physical factors, the milk supply becomes much
greater, sometimes to the extent of 40% above the fall output.
22. See Rohrer v. Milk Control Board, 322 Pa. 257, 265, i86 Atl. 336, 340 (1936).
23. Ibid. See also Brief of Inter-State Milk Producers' Cooperative on Petition
for Reargument, p. i, Green v. Milk Control Commission, i6 A. (2d) 9 (Pa. Sup.
Ct. 1940).
24. Hoffman, Debits-Credits Plans, Inter-State Milk Producers Review, December, 2940, p. 12, col. 3.
25. Robie, A Review of the Year in Bulletin, Massachusetts Milk Control Board,
July-August, i939, quoted in Lyman, note 12 supra, at i5.
26. In addition to the usual difficulties attending the attempted enactment of
proposed legislation the particular problems in Pennsylvania are pointed out in Hoffman, note 24 supra.
i. Lord Thurlow is generally credited with being the first to use the clause 'and
not by way of anticipation'. LEWIN, TRUSTS (14th ed. 1939) 710; FOuLKE, RULES
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tenant in his enjoyment of the income.2 However, the remaindermen in
the instant case contend that the effect of this anticipation clause was to
prevent the dividends in question from vesting in the life tenant. This contention is based on the premise that the spendthrift provision 3 affords the
life tenant full protection and therefore the anticipation clause must mean
something more, i. e. that the word "accrue" must have been used in the
sense of income actually received by the trustee. The meaning necessarily
depends on the context of the instrument, and the words ". . . any
attempt to so anticipate . . . shall be wholly disregarded by the Trustee
. . ", which immediately follow the anticipation clause, indicate an intent
to exercise control over the life tenant, rather than to alter the time at which
the income "vests". 5 Moreover, to give the same clause a different meaning when used with a spendthrift provision would lead to confusion, and it
is evident, when one considers that deeds and written instruments are often
purposely redundant for protective reasons, that this would be neither necessary nor wise. Since the anticipation clause is an incident of the spendthrift trust 6 it should be read as a part of that provision, which has "...
nothing to do with 'vesting' . . . only to the power to alienate the interest".7 Since most trust deeds contain many other clauses of prohibition and
forfeiture it was felt that a case turning solely on the clause against anticipation would not be likely to arise," and because this method of creating a
spendthrift trust is so widespread 1 prophetic ability is not needed to foresee
the havoc that the decision required by the remainderman's contention
would have causedY°
AGAINST PERPETUITIEs, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATIONS, AND RESTRAINTS ON ENJOYMENTS As APPLICABLE TO GIFTS OF PROPERTY IN PENNSYLVANIA (1909) § 596. At

common law in order to create a separate use for the wife, which the husband could
not control, marriage settlements in the form of trusts were devised. The anticipation clause developed as a means of restraining the wife's uncontrolled power in such
a trust, which made it possible for her to assign her income, or charge it with the
payment of her husband's debts, thus defeating the object of the separate use. Ibid.
Thus it is evident that originally the clause did not affect 'vesting', and there is no
indication that its meaning has ever changed.
2. "An analysis of the nature of a spendthrift trust shows that it does not affect
the quantum of the estate created by the trust, but only protects the cestui que trust
in its enjoyment." Smith's Estate, 1io Pa. Super. 469, 475, 169 Atl. 16, 17 (1933).
3. "I direct that the principal or corpus of my estate and the income therefrom,
so long as the same are held by my trustees, shall be free from the control, debts,
liabilities and engagements of any one beneficially interested therein and shall not be
subject to assignment by them, nor to execution process for the enforcement of

judgments or claims of any sort against them."
instant case at 668.
4. Instant case at 668.

5.

Spendthrift provision from the

GRIswoLD, SPENDTHRIFr TRUSTS (1936) § 294.

6. See GRISWOLD, id. at § 265, ". . . a spendthrift trust, one of the incidents of
which is a restraint on voluntary alienation."
7. Note 5 supra. See also note 2 supra.
8. FOULKE, note I supra at § 28o.
9. It is so done in Pennsylvania, ibid., and from the instant case this would seem
to be true to some extent in Delaware. That the Pennsylvania practice might be
copied elsewhere seems only natural in view of the fact that "spendthrift trusts"
originated here. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (2d ed.
§§ 214-235h; GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (1936) §§ 25-33; Note (193I) 36

L. REV. 45.
IO.The instant decision,
tion of the dividend rather
Northern Central Dividend
Blake, 247 Mass. 43o, 142 N.

1895)

DICK.

of course, applies the usual rule. The time of declarathan the time fixed for its payment is determinative.
Cases, 126 Md. 16, 94 Atl. 338 (1915); Hayward v.
E. 52 (1924); Harrow, Stock Dividends as Principal or
Income in the Administration of Trusts (1933) 8 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 17; Note
(924)

38

HARV.

L.

REv. 245; 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) §236,2.

RECENT CASES

Vendor and Purchaser-Right of Seller after Agreement of Sale
to Damages for Injuries to Premises-One joint tenant transferred
his interest to the other under an agreement of sale which allowed grantee
immediate and exclusive possession. A third party having injured the
premises before delivery of the deed, grantor accepted a reduction of the
purchase price. Grantor now seeks to enter as party plaintiff in grantee's
action for damages. Held, grantor's petition denied as he had no interest
in the land at the time of the injury. Petition of Butler County Com'rs
Appeal of Andre, I5 A. (2d) 504 (Pa. Super. Ct. 194o).
Courts generally ascribe the incidents of ownership to the vendee under
a contract for the sale of land.' However, because of a gradual realization
that an arbitrary application of equitable conversion often brings unfair
results, a wide divergence of authority has developed concerning which
party to an agreement of sale should bear the risk of loss. Although the
majority still categorically imposes the burden on the vendee as "equitable
owner", 2 other opinions place it on the vendor until legal title passes,8 on
the vendor until the time legal title is supposed to be conveyed,4 on the
party in possession, 5 or on the party who was intended to carry the risk as
evidenced by all the operative facts.6 Absent unusual circumstances, any of
the above views, except that which links risk with the holding of legal title,
would properly place the burden of loss, and consequently the sole right
to damages from a tortfeasor, on the vendee in possession. But, the court
overlooks the unique situation involved in the instant case in that vendor
has already borne the risk of loss by accepting a reduction in the purchase
price. Consequently, the refusal to admit vendor as a party plaintiff, on
the grounds that he lacked any real interest in the property at the time of
its injury, effects a windfall to the vendee contrary to the avowed purpose
of the doctrine of equitable conversion.7 Since the use of a fiction is
excusable only to promote justice,8 it should not be invoked when the
result will be an undue hardship on one party. The instant case by broadly
declaring the vendee to be beneficial "owner" without regard to the particular equities involved reveals the danger of making a maxim the reason for
a result rather than a convenient label to describe a certain class of results.9
1. WILusroN, CONTRAcTs (rev. ed. 1936) § 930.
Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349 (Ch. 18Ol); Obrien v. Paulsen, 192 Iowa 1351,
186 N. W. 44o (1922); Sewell v. Underwood, 197 N. Y. I68, go N. E. 430 (910).
See McCLINTOCK, EQUITY (936)
§ 109; WIaLIsTO,
op. cit. supra 928; Keener,
2.

The Burden of Loss as an Incident of the Right to Specific Perfornwce of a Contract (i9oi)

I CoL. L. REV. i; Pound, Progressof the Law, i918-29, Equity (192o)

33 HAxv. L. REV. 8,3, 826 et seq.
3. Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221, 128 N. E. 13 (i2o); Ashford v. Reese,
132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (2925); Notes (1912)

Micn. L. REV. 487.
4. See
et seq.

LANGDELL,

12 CoL. L. REV. 257, (1931)

29

A BREF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDIcrioN (2d ed. igo8) 58

5. Appleton Electric Co. v. Rogers, 2oo Wis. 331, 228 N. W.

505 (2930);

Williston, "The Risk of Loss After an Executory Contract for Sale in the Common
Law (1895) 9 HARV. L. REV. io6, I et seq.; Notes (1922) 6 MINN. L. REV. 513,
(923)

2 WIs. L. REV. 174.

6. See Vanneman, Risk of Loss, in Equity, Between the Date of Contract to Sell
Real Estate and Transfer of Title (1924) 8 MINN. L. REV. 127, 241; (1930)
PA. L. REV. 239; (1920) 6 CORN. L. Q. III.

7. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY (1936)

79 U. OF

02.

8. See Langdell, Equitable Conversion (1904) 18 HARv. L. REv. I, 13.
9. See Stone, Equitable Cowversion by Contract (1913) 13 COL. L. REV. 369;
Vanneman, supra note 6.

